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John W. Dean III and the Watergate
Cover-up, Revisited
Luke A. Nichter

O

n Super Bowl Sundayset the s tandard for Nixon tape
because my wife is from
transcription. His permanent loss of
Pittsburgh I remember
hearing is the price he paid so that
that otherwise unimportant detail
generations could learn from his
vividly-I picked up the New York
groundbreaking work. Numerous
Times from my driveway and was
critics have raised objections- not
surprised to find a front-page
all of them legitimate-to Abuse of
article about Watergate. After all,
Power and to Kutler's earlier book,
this is 2009, not 1974. The article,
Tlie Wars of Watergate, but Klingman's
article, which was submitted for
"John Dean at Issue in Nixon Tapes
Feud," by Patricia Cohen, explored
publication to the American Historical
accusations of misrepresentation
Review, is the most pointed and the
leveled at a prominent scholar
most prominent of these critiques.6
of Watergate,
ln it Klingman
Stanley Kutler,
accuses Kutler
Working in the pre-digital
by historian Peter
of knowingly
e
ra with difficult analog
Klingman. It
conflating two
cassette audiotapes, Ku tie r set
tape transcripts
quickly set off a
the standard for ixon tape
heated debate in
from March 16,
transcriptio n. His permanent loss
1973, both of
the blogosphere. 1
of hearing is the price he paid so
Stan Katz of
which contained
that generations could learn from
Princeton's
discussions
his g roundbreaking work.
between President
Woodrow Wilson
Nixon and Counsel
School called the
to the President
Times article a
John Dean about managing the
"nonevent."2 John Dean called it the
work of " Watergate revisiorusts."3
Watergate cover-up. Kutler did
indeed append an excerpt from a
However, acknowledging the by now
well-defined lines of de marcation
morning conversation in the Oval
Office7 to a transcript8 that begins
with respect to Watergate, Joan
Hoff admonished fellow bloggers
with an excerpt from an entirely
that "what this dispute over the
diffe rent telephone con versation
Nixon tapes really demonstrates is
from the evening of the same day.9
the need for an authoritative set of
That fact is no longer in dispute,
transcriptions which the government
although it is unclear how or why
should have undertaken years ago." 4
Kutler conflated these conversations.
After all, nowhere in this controversy
Klingman argues that as a result
of
Kutler's conflation and selective
did actual evidence feature
editing,
Dean appeared to be much
prominently, either in the Times
less
involved
in the cover-up than he
article or in the discussion following
the article's publication.
really was.
Other critics, including Len
At the heart of the latest installment
Colodny
(Silent Coup), Russ Baker
of a decade-old debate is the work
(Family of Secrets), and Joan Hoff
most often dted on the Watergate
(Nixo11 Reconsidered) have also
portion of the Nixon tapes,
5
accused Ku tier of misrepresenting
Kutler's Abuse of Power. Working
Watergate in Abuse of Power. The
in the pre-digital e ra with difficult
case they and Klingman make is
analog cassette audiotapes, Kutler
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complicated, but the re are three main
charges:
l. The Nixon tapes for the period
beginning March 13, 1973 are critical
to our understanding of how the
White House, including Dean,
p lanned and managed the entire
cover-up. 10 This period begins with
Nixon first learning on March 13
of White House involveme nt in
the Watergate break-in and ends
w ith the famous "Cancer o n the
Presidency" conversation on March
21. The "Cancer" conversation is
Nixon's "Rubicon moment," in that
it set Dean on an irreversible path
from Nixon's d efender-in-chief to
w histleblower-in-chief. Withi n weeks
Dean hired his own criminal defense
attorney, was dismissed, and in
June began his marathon testimony
that expedited the unraveling of the
Nixon presidency. In Abuse of Power,
Kutler leaves out critical Nixon/
Dean conversation mate rial from
March 13, 17, and 20. All of these
conversations, coincidentally o r not,
were devastating to Dean. They show
that not only was Dean one of the
original planners of the " intelligence
operation" that led to the breakin, but that he hired Liddy in part
because of Liddy's successful breakin at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist. In Kutler' s defense,
some of these conversations were not
part of his lawsuit to force release of
the "Abuse of Government Power"
Nixon tape segments.

2. As noted in Patricia Cohen's

New York Times article, Ku tier's critics
claim that he conflates, in Abuse of
Power, two distinct conversations that
occurred nine hours apart on March
16, 1973.
Pnssporl April 2009

3. Finally, and this is where
Kutler's critics move from evidence
to speculation, they a rgu e that he
deliberately omitted and conflated
some conversations and that he
harbors some motive for doing
so. While this distortion does not
change what we know about the
break-in and only marginally
affects our understand ing of the
president's role in the cover-up,
Kutler's critics argue that Dean's
role on the path to "Cancer" has not
received a p roper exposition and that
Ku tier's presentation of the cr itical
week leading up to the "Can cer"
conversation is ske..,ved . As to
aJlegations that he made Dean appear
more benign on the path to "Can cer"
than he really was, Kutler admits that
he is friends with Dean but notes that
the friendship blossomed only after
the publication of Abuse of Power. Of
course, this is the weakest part of the
argument made by Kutler's critics.
Without evidence of any acts of
commission or omission, Ku tier must
be taken at his word.
The article in the New York Times
obviously piqued the interest
of man y scholars, but they have
reserved judgment, pending further
evidence. Most people, I believe,
were as su rprised as I was to see
this article on the front page of the
Times, and they simply want to
know whether this issue is worth
paying attention to and whethe r
there is anything "new" in this longstanding feud. The real story, which
has been missed up to this point, is
that we now have the technology to
create improved transcriptions of
the tapes and disseminate them and
the original audio recordings widely.
It is therefore time for a complete
reevaluation of Watergate, and it is
to be hoped that the Times article
will prompt such a reevaluation,
focusing in particular on the week of
March 13 and the path to "Cancer."
This reexamination should do what
journalist David Frost was unable
to do in the 1970s and what Stanley
Kutler was unable to do in the 1990s.
As someone with the necessary
background in the ixon tapes, I
felt that I had a responsibility to try
to explain the dispute to a wider
audience, and when I was asked to
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d o so, l agreed without reservation. I
certainly do not seek to insert myself
in a debate that began before I started
graduate school. I happen to believe
that Klingman's fight against Kutler
is mis placed and that the real story is
not Ku tier, although he plays a role
in it. But readers should come to their
own conclusions. To help them do
that I have assembled all the uncut
audio files and conversations from
the six Nixon / Dean conversations
now under scrutiny from the week of
March 13. For reasons of space, I have
condensed the hours of audio and
hundreds of pages of transcripts here.
Much of this material is being made
readily available to the public for the
fi rst time.
March 13, 1973, 12:42-2:00 p.m.
Oval Office 878-014; Richard Nixon,
John W. Dean III, H.R. Haldeman 11

Dean informed the president
that the week of March 13 might be
perhaps the single most important
week of the cover-up.12 The
conversation began as a general
discussion about why it would not
be in the president's interest to allow
live testimony of Nixon aides before
the Ervin Watergate committee.
Nixon and Dean wanted to protect
aides Dwight Chapin and Chuck
Colson, then in the private sector,
because of the likelihood that the
investigation wouJd more quickly
penetrate the White House. The
discussion turned towards other
White House vulnerabilities. The
Campaign to Re-Elect the President
(CREEP) had paid a minor to
infiltrate "peace groups," a scheme
that had recently unraveled because
"he apparently chatted about it
around school," Dean su rmised.
" It's absurd. It really is. He didn' t do
anything illegal." 13 Dean also told
Nixon that a speech supporting the
administration would be planted
in Senator Ba rry Goldwater's office
for delivery on the Senate floor. "It's
in the mill," Dean said.14 Nixon
asked Dean if he needed any help
from the Internal Revenue Service,
ostensibly to maintain discipline
while managing the cover-up. Dean
responded that he alread y had access
to the fRS and had a mechanism

to bypass Commissioner Johnnie
Walters. 15 Referring to himself in the
third person,1 6 Dean informed the
president for the first time that Chief
of Staff H.R. Haldeman had advance
knowled ge of Donald Segretti's
"pra,lkster-type activities." 17 To
slow the FBI's investigation, Dean
suggested restructuring the FBJ1 8
and emphasized the need to move
the focus of the investigation
immediately from the Nixon White
House to De mocrats and past
administrations.19 After complaining
to the president about "dishonest"
media reporting that was "out of
sequence," Dean explained the
convoluted way in which Gordon
Liddy received his Watergate breakin funds. Liddy's error, Dean said,
was unnecessarily involving a third
party in the cashing of checks, which
left a traceable record.20 Another
problem for the White House was
former CREEP treasurer Hugh
Sloan. Dean said he was "scared,"
"weak," and had "a compulsion to
cleanse his soul by confession."21
Dean also stated his preference to
answer all Ervin committee inquiries
with "sworn interrogatories" rather
than live testimony, since written
responses could be "artfully"
answered.22 Fina1Jy, Dean predicted
the direction that the investigation
would take.23 " I don' t think the thing
will get out of hand," he said, but
those in danger included Charles
Colson, John Mitchell, George
Strachan, Dwight Chapin, and, by
extension, H.R. Haldeman and John
Ehrlichman. Dean also warned of a
"domino situation" if bank records
were traced .24 For example, he told
the president that bank records
would show that the administration
had been paying someone to tail
Senator Ed ward Kennedy for "almost
two years." The tail began "within
six hours" of Chappaquiddick. 25
1n concluding the conversation,
Dean said he would work with
aide Richard A. Moore to work out
a plan to broaden the focus of the
investigation beyond the Nixon
White House.26
March 16, 1973, 10:34-11:10 a.m.
Oval Office 881-003; Richard
Page 5

Nixon, John W. Dean III, Ronald L.
Ziegler27
Dean reminded the president
of the need to get the focus of the
investigation off the Nixon White
House. "We have to get off the
defensive. We have to broaden," Dean
said.28 Nixon and Dean agreed that a
falsified document that appeared to
be an independent assessment of the
Watergate cover-up would be helpful.
"l have drafted such a document,
back in December," Dean stated.
Nixon wanted to make sure the
document appeared to be "a White
House statement, not [a] presidential
statement." Dean clarified that he had
originally drafted such a statement in
an act of contingency planning after
the 1972 elections. Dean said that it
might be time to recirculate his report
again, which was based on ''written,
sworn affidavits." 29 However, Dean
warned of the limits of such a report
midway through the investigation.
"Some questions you can' t answer, or
if you do, you get people in trouble."
Therefore, to avoid perjuring
those who have already provided
testimony, a new more general
falsified document had to be created.
Dean stated his preference for the
creation of "a good master plan" that
would be more comprehensive than
his previous report.30
March 16, 1973, 8:14-8:23 p.m.
White House Telephone 037-134;
Richard Nixon, John W. Dean 1II31

ln a phone call later that same day,
President Nixon agreed with Dean's
earlier suggestion to work with
Richard A. Moore on a new falsified
report as discussed earlier that day.32
Dean warned the president that such
a report could make perjurers out
of some witnesses: it could "open
up a new grand jury" and "would
cause difficulty for some who've
already testified." 33 Dean stated his
preference for two reports: the first
a written report based on "sworn
affidavits" that was "not a total
answer" intended for the Ervin
committee and the public,34 and
a second oral report only for the
president to inform him of additional
vulnerabilities of which he might
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not have been aware.35 Although
Dean informed Nixon of White
House involvement in the cover-up
on March 13, Dean noted that the
conclusions of his written report
"were based on the fact that there
was not a scintilla of evidence in the
investigation that led anywhere to
the White House."36 Relieved, Dean
informed the president that the FBI
files that Ervin would receive would
not include grand jury minutes,
which was a lot more thorough
than the FBI had been.37 Dean also
recommended that his written report
bundle Watergate with the previously
disclosed "trankster-type activities"
of Segretti.

and that an official statement to that
effect from the White House would
be helpful.44 "Can' t do that," Nixon
replied. Dean then switched to using
Segretti as a scapegoat, which won
more favor with the president.45
" It was pranksterism that got out
of hand," Dean said. Finally, Dean
explained the discovery of the bizarre
connection of the investigation to
top Nixon aide John Ehrlichman,
who had used Liddy in previous
operations, including the break-in
at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist.-'6 Since Liddy was also
caught at the Watergate, he would
eventually lead the investigation to
Ehrlichman, Dean warned.

March 17, 1973, 1:25-2:10 p.m.
Oval Office 882-012; Richard
Nixon, John W. Dean III, H.R.
Haldeman39

March 20, 1973, Unknown time
between 1:42 and 2:31 p.m.
Oval Office 884-017; Richard Nixon,
John W. Deantlll, Richard A. Moore

President Nixon reminded Dean
that his falsified report should
conclude that no one from the White
House was involved, based on
"Dean's evaluation."40 Dean stated
that he wanted to go even further
than that: Nixon should hold a
meeting with Ervin and disclose that
CREEP had a leg itimate "intelligence
operation in place" based on
"handwritten," "sworn statements"
and that the White House had cut
itself off from anything illegal.41
Dean then revealed that he knew
about the "intelligence operation"
six months before the Watergate
break-in.42 The initial meeting that
set up the operation was attended by
Dean, Mitchell, Jeb Magruder, and
Liddy. Dean told Haldeman that the
operation should be kept " ten miles"
from the White House. Nixon then
asked Dean who he thought was
presently most vulnerable.43 Dean
noted that he himself was, because
"I've been all over this thing like a
blanket." Colson, Chapin, Mitchell,
and Haldeman v,,ere also vulnerable.
Dean stated that he called break-in
planner Liddy the Monday after
the break-in for an explanation.
According to Dean, Haldeman
deputy Strachan pushed campaign
aide Magruder to compel Liddy to
do the break-in. Dean recommended
that Magruder become the scapegoat

Dean and Moore presented a draft
of the recently completed falsified
report to the president. Dean noted
that Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler
had concerns that it would raise
mo re questions than it answered.
Noting that it was just a draft, Moore
stated that "it needs one more go
around; we did the best ,,ve could." In
particular, "of the eight paragraphs,
I think there are about three that are
troublesome." 47 Dean and Moore
gave a copy of the report to Nixon,
who directed various revisions on
the spot, including how to rephrase
Dean's previous involvement with
Strachan and Segretti.
March 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m.
Oval Office 886-008; Richard
Nixon, John W. Dean III, H.R.
Haldeman

Dean warned Nixon that there
was a "cancer" on the presidency,48
and he offered for the first time a
complete recollection of how the
planning for Watergate originated,
which started as "an instruction to
me from Bob Haldeman." 49 Dean
claimed that Haldeman originally
asked Dean to set up a domestic
intelligence operation at CREEP.
Dean initiated contact with Jack
Caulfield, who was Nixon's former
bodyguard.50 However, Mitchell and
Passport April 2009

Ehrlichman did not like Caulfield-51
Dean brought in Liddy instead, who
came recomme nded by White House
aide Bud Krogh on the basis of the
successful break-in a t Ellsberg's
psychiatrist's o£fice.52 Mitchell
a pproved of Liddy. ext, Magruder
invited Dean over to CREEP
headquarters to discuss Liddy's
intelligence plan. Dean d escribed
the plan, w hich included "black bag
operations, kidnapping, p roviding
prostitutes to weake n the o ppositio n,
bugging, mugging teams .... It was
just an incredible thing." 53 After the
initial meeting, Dean also attended
a second meeting to discuss Liddy's
plan, which induded " bugging,
kidnapping, a nd the like." 5-t Dean,
Mitchell, Magruder, and Liddy
were present at the meeting. Dean
said he did not hea r an ything about
Liddy's plan again after that meeting,
so he assu med the more extre me
elements v,,ould no t be carried o u t.55
However, Dean conceded that he and
Liddy "had so many o the r things"
going o n. Dean said he thought that
Halde man assumed that the Liddy
plan was " proper," 56 w hich resulted
in Haldem an aide Strachan pushing
Magruder, who asked pe rmission
from Mitchell, who conse nted to
the Liddy-led Watergate breakin. Dean noted tha t informa tion
gathered from the break-in was
used by Strachan and Haldeman.57
As the 1972 de mocratic presidential
campaign took shape, Halde man
authorized Liddy to change his target
from Sena to r Muskie to Senator
McGovern.58 Once again, this
message passed through StrachanMagruder-Liddy. Dean noted tha t
Liddy previously infiltrated Muskie's
secreta ry and ch auffeur. " othing
illegal about that," Dean said.
Although he had not heard anything
again until the break-in, w hen Dean
learned about it on June 17 he "knew
what it was."59 Nixon then asked
Dean for an update on any perjuries.
Dean was not sure if Mitchell had
perjured himself, but he was sure
that Mag rude r had, as had Herbert
Porter, a Magruder d epu ty.60 Dean
claimed they pe rjured the mselves
by testify ing that they had thou gh t
that Liddy was legitima te, and tha t
they did not know anything abou t
Passport April 2009

activities related to the De mocratic
National Committee. After the breakin, Dean "was under instructions
not to investigate" and instead
worked o n containing it "right
where it was." 61 All the burglars got
counsel immediately and pla nned to
ride out any charges until the 1972
election was over.62 However, soon
afte r, the burglars began making
demands for money. Dean was
present when Mitchell authorized
raising cash for the m, w hich was to
be funneled through H oward Hunt.
Dean noted that not only was it
becoming more difficult to meet the
burgla rs' growing need s, but that
it was "obs truction o f justice," and
that Dean, Mitchell, Erhlichman,
a nd Halde man were culpable.63
Dean summarized that the biggest
problem was a "continual blackmail
operation."64 Dean also expanded
on other vulnerabilities, including a
previous plan to d o "a second-story
job o n the Brookings Institute, w he re
they had the Pe ntagon Pape rs." 65
Summarizing, Dean said that would
have been too risky. "lf the risk is
minimal and the gain is fantastic,
that's something else, but w ith a
little risk a nd no gain, it's not worth
it." Dean also noted that there were
other "soft spots."66 The proble m of
the "continued blackmail," he said,
is that "this is the sort of thing mafia
people can do." Dean estimated that
a millio n dollars was needed over
the next two years. Nixon responded,
"I know w here it can be gotten."
Dean suggested that Mitchell should
handle the money, "and get some
pros to help him." 67
These materials should help us see
th e Watergate cover-up in a new light.
If this is "Watergate revisionism,"
the n so be it. Pe rhaps a little
Watergate revis ionism is needed, a nd
technology, as is evide nt in this brief
article, can be harnessed in ways that
permit us to reconstruct these events
and come to new interpretations.
The president of the United States
is barely moved when his counsel
infor med him in these conversations
that most of the preside nt's top aides
were involved in various iJlegalities.
Dean told Nixon on March 13 that
Haldeman deputy Strachan knew

there was White House involvement
in the Wate rgate break-in, even while
Dean concluded in his fa lsified report
for Senator Ervin and the public
that the White House had no such
knowledge. John Dean was not only
involved in managing the cover-up,
but by his own admission was pa rt of
the inner core of planners who set up
CREEP's " intelligence ope ration." He
stated that he and Halde man initiated
the planning that led to the Watergate
break-in. Dean not only hired Gordon
Liddy, but did so on the basis of his
successful break-in at the office of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatris t. Dean
admitted that he began the coverup shortly after the 1972 election
by creating a falsified report that
concluded that the White House
had nothing to do w ith the break-in.
He conceded that he was present
with Mitchell when authorization
was given to bribe witnesses. Dean
recommended to the president that
Mitchell handle the bribes, but that
some "pros" should help him. Dean,
in his own words, admitted to the
president that he was involved in
"an obstruction of justice." Most
of all, neither Dean nor Nixon did
a nything to stop this reckless and
illegal behavior. Paraphrasing the
pres ident's men culpa during the
David Fros t interviews, Nixon may
h ave " let the country d own," but it
was the country that had to e ndure,
paraphrasing again, a " long national
nightmare." The nightmare is not
over yet, not as long as we have still
more to learn.

Luke Nichter is Assistant
Professor of History at Tarleton State
University-Central Texas.68
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